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Abstract:

‘#MySubjectivation’ explores some of the implications changes in the media landscape, including those generated by the development of corporate social media and social networks such as Twitter and Facebook, have for the ways in which theorists and philosophers create, perform and circulate research and knowledge. It takes as its starting point Bernard Stiegler’s claim that, with the Web and digital reproducibility, we are now living in an era in which subjects are created with a different form of the awareness of time. It proceeds by paying special attention to the medium Stiegler himself employs most frequently to analyse the relation between subjectivity, technology and time: the linearly written and organised, print-on-paper codex text, with all its associated concepts, values and habitual practices (e.g. the long-form argument, individualized proprietorial author, originality, copyright). Can the ongoing changes in the media landscape that are said to be shaping our memories and consciousness be understood, analysed and rethought by subjectivities that continue to live, work and think on the basis of knowledge instruments

originating in a very different epistemic environment? Or is the continued reliance of theorists and philosophers on print-on-paper books and journals an example of how capitalism's cultural and programming industries invent *us* and our own knowledge work, philosophy and minds by virtue of the way they modify and homogenise *our* thought and behaviour through their media technologies?

Keywords: attention, control, cultural industries, digital, economy, memory, publishing, social media, Stiegler, subjectivity, technology, university, writing

Over the last few years a number of radical theorists and philosophers, including Franco 'Bifo' Berardi and Jodi Dean, have positioned digital media technologies, and corporate social media and social networks in particular, as contributing to the formation of a new kind of human subjectivity. It is a subjectivity suffering from attention deficit disorders that is rendered anxious, panicked and deeply depressed by the accelerated, over-stimulated, over-connected nature of life and work under 21st century capitalism.[1] Others, such as Manuel Castells and Felix Stalder, have been keen to portray the Occupy

movement, Arab spring, anti-austerity and student protests as expressive of new ways of being human that are markedly different to those generated by neoliberalism.[2] Yet in the era of Anonymous, Occupy, and the *Indignadas*, with their explicit rejection of the drive toward individual fame that constitutes an inherent part of modern capitalist society, and emphasis on non-hierarchical forms of organization instead, do we need to critically explore new *ways of being radical theorists and philosophers too*? Ways that are unlike us, at least as we currently live, work and think, in that they are not so tightly bound up with the culture and logic of neoliberalism?

Significantly, few of the key theorists whose thought provides a framework for the study of the relationship between culture, media and society have paid *serious* attention to the implications changes in the media landscape have *for their own ways of creating, performing and circulating knowledge and research*.[3] The majority have been content to operate with norms, conventions, practices and modes of production that originated in very different eras. With surprisingly few exceptions they are those of the rational, liberal, humanist author working alone in a study, library or office. Motivated by a 'desire for pre-eminence, authority and disciplinary power', to quote Stanley Fish's characterisation of his own ambition as a literary critic, this author produces a written text designed to make an argument so forceful and masterly it is difficult for others not to concur.[4] Claiming it as the original creative expression of his

own unique mind, the lone author submits the written work for publication as part of a paper (or papercentric) journal or book. Once the work has been peer-reviewed and accepted for publication, it is eventually made available for sale under the terms of a publisher's policy, licence or copyright agreement. The latter asserts his right to be identified and acknowledged as its author and to have it attributed to him as his intellectual property; transfers the rights to the commercial exploitation of the text or work as a commodity that can be bought and sold for profit to the publisher; reserves the right to control and determine who publishes, circulates and reproduces the text, how, where and in which contexts; and prevents the integrity of the original, fixed and final form of the text from being modified or distorted by others.

Yet if the majority of key theorists *have* remained somewhat blind to the implications of changes in the media landscape for their own ways of performing knowledge (a landscape that *shapes* even if it does not *determine* human consciousness), one thinker has paid a lot of attention to the relation between subjectivity, technology and time at least: the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler. It is to Stiegler's work that I am therefore going to turn for help in order to begin thinking through the relation between digital media technologies, temporality, and our ways of living, acting, working and thinking *as* theorists and philosophers. That said, it is impossible to provide a full account of Stiegler's oeuvre here, such is it size and scope. The back cover

blurb of the 2009 English translation of *Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation*, refers to his having published seventeen books in 'the last five years alone'. What are we to make of this extreme productivity on his part? Is it in its own way an instance of the speed Stiegler links to disorientation and the industrialization of memory in this book? It is a possibility that haunts much of what follows which, aware a great deal of work is still to be done on the many issues raised by Stiegler's philosophy (for all *New Formations*' has recently published an issue on the subject), serves merely as an initial attempt to contribute to any such future study.

The Philosophical Impossibility of Unliking Media Technologies in the Mind of Someone Living

Building on the philosophy of Jacques Derrida, Stiegler argues that the relation of the human to technology is one of originary technicity or prosetheticity. What this means is that, contrary to the classical Aristotelian view, technology (i.e. that which is organised but inorganic, manufactured, artificial) is not added to the human from the outside and only after the latter's birth, as an external prosthesis, tool or instrument used to bring about certain ends. The human is rather born out of its relation to technology. As far as Derrida is concerned, the association of time with the technology of writing means that this originary

relation between technology, time and the human can be understood as a form of writing, or *arche-writing* (i.e. writing in general, which is '*invoked* by the themes of "the arbitrariness of the sign" and of difference'- as opposed to any actual historical system of writing, including that of speech).[5] As Stiegler asserts in a relatively early essay, 'Derrida and Technology', all media for Derrida, 'beginning with the most primal traces… and extending as far as the Web and all forms of technical archiving and high-fidelity recording, including those of the biotechnologies… are figures, in their singularity, of the originary default of origin that arche-writing constitutes'.[6] For Stiegler, however, such an understanding universalizes arche-writing and underplays the specificity of different media technologies and their relation to time. Instead, he emphasizes the historical and contingent nature of this relation. Put simply, because the human is born out of a relation to technology, and because time is only possible and can only be accessed and experienced as a result of its prior inscription in concrete, technical forms, the nature of subjectivity and consciousness changes over time as media technologies change. Drawing on the argument of the palaeontologist André Leroi-Gourhan, to the effect that the emergence of the human species coincided with the use of tools, Stiegler presents this process as having begun in the Upper Palaeolithic period, its most recent stage being the Web. In 'The Discrete Image', another early essay, in this case on the epistemology of digital photography, he thus stresses that we must distinguish between:

- the reproducibility of the letter, first handwritten and then printed;
- analog reproducibility (i.e. photographic and cinematographic), which Benjamin studied extensively;
- digital reproducibility.

It is 'these three great types of reproducibility', Stiegler insists, that 'have constituted and overdetermined the great *epochs* of memory' in the West, producing eras in which subjects are created with *different* forms of the awareness of time.[7]

At this point a similar criticism can be made of Stiegler - and by implication of those theorists of digital media who have followed him in this respect, such as Mark Hansen and N. Katherine Hayles, whose positions build upon Stiegler's use of the related concept of technogenesis - as he makes of Derrida.[8] Just as Derrida sees all media as figures of the originary default of origin constituted by arche-writing, Stiegler himself argues 'for a generalised technicity – especially as a condition of temporality'.[9] From a more strictly Derridean viewpoint, then, Stiegler does not do enough 'to preserve the ontological difference between the technical synthesis of time and *différance* as the quasi-transcendental condition of possibility for time'.[10] Nevertheless, despite this (and in a sense precisely

because of it), Stiegler's work can be extremely helpful when it comes to thinking through the role the changing technical environment, and with it the emergence of digital media technologies, plays in the production of human subjectivity. This can be demonstrated by turning to his understanding of the cultural industries.

To simplify his argument for the sake of economy, Stiegler presents the cultural industries as subordinating the subject's consciousness and experience of time to the formalised, standardised, reproducible and controllable patterns and routines of their 'temporal industrial objects'. The cultural industries, and particularly the program (radio and television) industries within them, achieve this by connecting people and their attention to the same regular radio programmes, TV broadcasts and so forth on a mass basis. Accordingly, there is too little scope for the event, for singularity - for the 'welcoming of the new and opening of the undetermined to the improbable', to play on his 'idea of value defined as knowledge' from *Technics and Time, 2*.[11] Newspapers, for example, are described here as being machines 'for the production of ready-made ideas, for "clichés"', motivated by the demands of short-term profit, whose 'criteria of selection are aspects of marketability'.[12] As a consequence, the cultural and program industries interfere with the ability of each subject to singularly appropriate and transform what Stiegler, following Gilbert Simondon, calls the

pre-individual fund, which is the process that results in the psychic individuation of each individual. So much so that in a recent essay Stiegler is able to show how they function to suffocate desire and destroy the individual:

> As heritage of the accumulated experience of previous generations, this pre-individual fund exists only to the extent that it is singularly appropriated and thus transformed through the participation of psychic individuals who share this fund in common. However, it is only shared inasmuch as it is each time *individuated*, and it is individuated to the extent that it is *singularised*. The social group is constituted as *composition* of a synchrony inasmuch as it is recognised in a common heritage, and as a diachrony inasmuch as it makes possible and legitimises the singular appropriation of the pre-individual fund by each member of the group.
>
> The program industries tend on the contrary to *oppose* synchrony and diachrony in order to bring about a hyper-synchronisation constituted by the programs, which makes the *singular* appropriation of the pre-individual fund impossible. The program schedule … is conceived so that my lived past tends to become the same as that of my neighbours, and that our behaviour becomes herd-like.[13]

Perhaps one of the most interesting and important things to be learnt from Stiegler is that the way to respond responsibly to this 'industrialization of memory' and the threat it poses to the intellectual, affective and aesthetic capacities of millions of people today, is not by trying to somehow escape or elude the technologies of reproduction, or become otherwise *autonomous* from them. Originary technicity means there is no human without technology, as the '*who* is nothing without the *what*, since they are in a *transductive* relation during the process of exteriorization that characterizes life'.[14] Any such response must itself therefore involve such technologies. By the same token, neither can we proceed in the hope that the mass media of the cultural and program industries are eventually going to disappear or be abolished; or that we can replace them and the alienating affects of their one-to-many broadcasting model with the apparently more personal, participatory, many-to-many (as well as many-to-one, and one-to-one) model associated with the dominant digital media technologies. Witness the way a small number of extremely large corporations, including Amazon, Facebook and Google, are currently in the process of supplementing, if not entirely superseding, the 'old' cultural and program industries with regard to the subordination of consciousness and attention to pre-programmed patterns of information conceived as merchandise. They are doing so by exposing users to cultural and cognitive persuasion and manipulation (often but not always in the form of advertising) based on the

tracking and aggregation of their freely provided labour, content and public and personal data. This process is aimed at targeting individual users on a fine-grained, personalised and, with mobile media, even location-sensitive basis. Stiegler presents such technologies as *hypomnémata*: i.e. forms of *mnemonics* (cultural memory), which Plato described as *pharmaka*, or substances that function, undecidably, as neither simply poisons *nor* cures. Rather than reject or critique them outright, he suggests we need to explore how some of the *tendencies* of which our current economy of the *pharmakon* is composed can be deployed to give these technologies new and different inflections. As he posits when arguing for the development of a new critique of political economy as 'the task *par excellence* for philosophy' today, this 'economy of the *pharmaka* is a therapeutic that does not result in a hypostasis opposing poison and remedy: the economy of the *pharmakon* is a *composition* of tendencies, and not a dialectical struggle between *opposites*.'[15]

Of course, variations on the idea that reproductive media technologies - including corporate (i.e. privately-owned) social media and social networks such as Twitter and Facebook - are neither simply 'good or bad, productive or distracting, enabling or dangerous', have been put forward a number of times.[16] With more and more people today accessing the Internet using tethered mobile devices – phones and tablets – controlled either by their manufacturers, those who provide their operating systems, or the telecommunications companies that

operate the mobile networks, some critics have proposed radically *unliking* private, closed and semi-closed systems, including those represented by Apple's single-purpose apps, iDevices and iCloud computing. They have advocated time and attention be given instead to those tendencies within our current economy which encourage physical infrastructure and networks that are less centralised and more open to being continually updated, interrupted, reappropriated, transformed and reimagined. The emphasis here is on infrastructure and networks that make it easier for users to understand how such media are made, 'in order to restart the contract on different terms' and give users 'the right of response, right of selection, right of interception, right of intervention', to draw on Stiegler's televised conversation with Derrida.[17] The latter tendencies manifest themselves in the phenomena of much so-called internet piracy, the 'hacktivism' associated with 4chan and Anonymous,[18] as well as in 'alternative free and open source software that can be locally installed' by a range of different groups dedicated to working together to get things done, thus generating a 'multitude of decentralized social networks… that aspire to facilitate users with greater power to define for themselves with whom [to] share their data'.[19]

Yet when it comes to considering the relation between digital media technologies and our ways of living, working and thinking as theorists and

philosophers, a more intriguing question, I want to suggest, is one that often remains overlooked or otherwise ignored in academic discussions of YouTube, Instagram, LinkedIn, Tumblr, *et al*. This question concerns the very medium Stiegler himself employs most frequently and consistently to critique the specific changes in technology that are helping to shape subjectivity in the era of digital reproducibility: the linearly organised, bound and printed, paper, codex text. How appropriate is it for Stiegler to analyse and critique such changes as if he himself were in the main living and working in the epoch of writing and the printed letter, with all that implies with regards to *his* ways of being and doing as a philosopher? Is Stiegler - like Derrida before him, on his account - not in his own way privileging writing, and the associated forms and techniques of presentation, debate, critical attention, observation and intervention, as a means of understanding the specificity of networked digital media technologies and their relation to cultural memory, time and the production of human subjectivity?[20]

Stiegler's notion of originary technicity and the default of origin undermines the Romantic, humanist conception of the self as separate from those objects and technologies that provide it with a means of expression: writing, the book, film, photography, the Web, smart phone, tablet and so forth. Yet from the very first volume of *Technics and Time* (originally published in French in 1994) through

to the 2013 appearance in English of *What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology,* Stiegler to all intents and purposes continues to act *as if* he genuinely subscribes to the notion of the author as individual creative genius associated with the cultural tradition of European Romanticism. He persists in publishing books, including a number of multi-volume monographs, devoted to the building of long-form 'arguments that are intended to be decisive, comprehensive, monumental, definitive' and, above all, *his*.[21] In *Acting Out*, for example – which, interestingly, is composed of two short books on how he became a philosopher and narcissism respectively – Stiegler repeatedly uses phrases such as this is what 'I call' 'primordial narcissism…. the "becoming-diabolical"…. a tertiary retention…. hypersynchronization'.[22] Indeed, at least in their compulsive repetition of the traditional, pre-programmed, ready-made methods of composition, accreditation, publication and dissemination, his books very much endeavour to remain the original creation of a stable, centered, indivisible and individualized, humanist, proprietary subject.

Of course, and as I have already indicated, it is not only Stiegler who *acts out* what it means to be a radical philosopher or critical theorist by writing and publishing in this fashion. Much the same can be said of Catherine Malabou, Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Rancière, Slavoj Žižek – in fact most thinkers of contemporary culture, media and society today.[23] This point even applies to those theorists of digital media who know how to code and produce

experimental e-literature, such as Wendy H. K. Chun, Alexander R. Galloway and N. Katherine Hayles. *How can it be otherwise* when academics in the humanities often need at least one monograph published with a reputable print press to secure that all important first position or tenure? Don't we all acquire much of *our* authority as scholars by acting romantically as if we were still living in the epoch of writing and print? Would we attach the importance to Stiegler's work we do if he had not (single-)authored so many codex books? Would he still be considered a serious thinker and philosopher, would most of us even have heard of Stiegler, had he operated in less conventional academic terms instead, merely as part of the *Ars Industrialis* association of cultural activists he formed in 2005, or any of the institutes he is connected to? [24] The latter include not just the Centre Pompidou's Innovation and Research Institute (IRI), which he currently directs, but also the INA (Audio-visual National Institute), where Stiegler moved the research department towards signal processing and analysis, and IRCAM (Institute for Acoustic and Musical Research Coordination), where he did something similar in the field of sound.[25]

As he put it an interview at the 2012 International World Wide Web conference when discussing his relationship to some of these projects:

> the new dynamics of knowledge needs henceforth that Web issues be questioned, practiced, theorized and critically problematized … as with the Bologna University during the 11th century, then with the Renaissance era, then with the Enlightment and Kant's question in Le conflit des facultés, we are living a significant organological change – knowledge instruments are changing and these instruments are not just means but rather shape an epistemic environment, an episteme, as Michel Foucault used to say.[26]

Nevertheless, for all his activities with IRI, INA, IRCAM, Ars Industrialis and now Pharmakon.fr to develop a new, enlarged organology for the contemporary era that includes digital technology, networks and software, the question remains:[27] if Stiegler is right, and with the Web and digital reproducibility we are now living in an era in which subjects are created with a different form of the awareness of time, to what extent can this episteme and the associated changes in the media ecology that are shaping our memories and consciousness be understood, analysed, rethought and reinflected by subjectivities that, to a very significant extent, continue to live, work and think on the basis of knowledge instruments originating in a very different epistemic environment?

Capital as Academic Subjectivation Machine

To explore this question and its implications for radical philosophers and critical thinkers further, let us return to Stiegler's claim that the task *par excellence* for philosophy now is the development of a new critique of political economy that is capable of responding to an epistemic environment very different to that known by Marx and Engels.[28] Stiegler has recently been held up by software theorist Alexander R. Galloway as 'one of the few people writing today' who approaches Gilles Deleuze's idea of the control society seriously, both 'as a political and philosophical problem' *and as a critique of political economy*.[29] Yet in one respect at least the control society is something Stiegler - in common with the majority of theorists who have alerted us to the power of algorithms - does not take anywhere near seriously enough. For if 'the *what* invents the *who* just as much as it is invented by it'[30]- if, in Galloway's words, 'one must today focus special attention on the way control acts on the realm of the "immaterial": knowledge work, thought, information and software, networks, technical memory, ideology, the mind', in order to follow Stiegler in shifting 'from a philosophy of "what is" [being, ontology] to a philosophy of "what does"' (what affects, what cares, which is a question of practice, ethics, politics)[31] - then taking Deleuze's idea seriously as a critique of political economy must surely involve paying careful critical attention to our own modes of production and ways of living, working, acting and thinking *as theorists and*

philosophers. In other words, we need to consider seriously how the *economy* of control invents *us* and our own knowledge work, philosophy and minds, as much as we invent it, by virtue of the way it modifies and homogenizes *our* thought and behaviour through its media technologies.

What is particularly interesting about Deleuze's thesis from this perspective is that it is not just the prison, factory or school of the disciplinary societies that are identified as being handed over to the corporation of the control societies. So is the institution in which many theorists and philosophers actually work and think, namely, the university. To draw on the contemporary UK context, the fundamental transformation in how universities in England are viewed, which was proposed by the New Labour government commissioned Browne Report published in 2010, and which has been imposed by the current Conservative/Liberal Democratic coalition (albeit with some modifications designed to generate further competition between institutions), provides what is only the most recent, high profile evidence of this state of affairs. It entails a shift from perceiving the university as a public good financed mainly from public funds, to treating it as a 'lightly regulated market'. Consumer demand, in the form of the choices of individual students over where and what to study, here reigns supreme when it comes to determining where the funding goes, and thus what is offered by competing 'service providers (i.e. universities)',[32] which are required to operate as businesses in order 'to meet business needs'.[33]

The consequences of handing the university over to the corporation are far from restricted to a transformation in how the university is viewed as an institution, or even to the production of the student as *consumer*. This process is also having a profound impact on *us* as academics and scholars (i.e. on that part of what some radical philosophers call the cognitiarian class which actually includes these philosophers themselves). Thanks to the Research Assessment Exercise and its successor, the Research Excellence Framework, many university professors in the UK are now given lighter teaching loads and even sabbaticals to allow them to concentrate on their research and achieve the higher ratings that will lead to increases in research profile and the generation of income for their institutions from government, businesses and external funding agencies. Individuals successful in doing so are then rewarded with even more funding and sabbaticals, which only increases the gap between these professors and those who are asked to carry a greater share of the teaching and administrative load. One result is the development of a transfer market whereby research stars are enticed to switch institutions by the offer of increased salaries, resources, support and status. At the same time, the emergence of more corporate forms of leadership, with many university managers now being drawn from the world of business rather than the ranks of academe, has resulted in a loss of power and influence on the part of professors over the running of their institutions, for all they may be in demand for their research and publications. A

lot of institutions in the UK currently require commercial (rather than purely intellectual) leadership from their professoriate, in line with the neoliberal philosophy that society's future success and prosperity rests on the corporate sector's ability to apply and exploit the knowledge and innovation developed in universities.

Professors and others in leadership roles are not the only ones affected, however. Most academics today belong to a 'self-disciplining, self-managed form of labour force'; one that 'works harder, longer, and often for less [or even no] pay precisely because of its attachment to some degree of personal fulfilment in forms of work engaged in'.[34] This is in part a result of their having to take on greater and intensified teaching and administrative loads, due to severe reductions in government spending on universities combined with an expansion in student numbers, along with the above-mentioned privileging of research stars. The increase in the number of fixed-term, part-time, hourly-paid, temporary and other forms of contingent positions (instructors, teaching assistants, post-docs, unpaid 'honorary' research assistants) as we enter deeper into a precarious labour regime is another significant aspect of the changing Higher Education environment. The result is a process of casualisation and proletarianisation Stiegler has described in a broader context as a loosing of knowledge, of *savor*, of existence, of '*what takes work beyond mere employment*', and as thus leading to a short-circuiting of individuation.[35] Yet

academics are also working longer and harder (and faster) as a consequence of the increasing pressure to be constantly connected and prepared for the real-time interaction that is enabled by laptops, tablets, smart phones, apps, email, SMS, Dropbox and Google Docs. Mobile media and the cloud mean scholars can now be found *at work*, checking their inbox, texting, chatting, blogging, tweeting, taking part in online classes, discussions and forums, not just in their office or even on campus, but also at home, when walking in the city, travelling by train or waiting at an airport in a completely different time zone from the rest of their institution. The pressure created by various forms of monitoring and measurement (such as the National Student Survey in the UK) for academics to show they are *always on* and available by virtue of their prompt responses to contact from colleagues and students only exacerbates this culture of 'voluntary' self-surveillance and self-discipline. So does the increasing use of electronic diaries open to scrutiny, together with swipe card readers that provide university management with data on where staff are at any given time. As a result, it is becoming harder and harder for academics to escape from (the time of) work.

If the university, like the school, is 'becoming less and less a closed site differentiated from the workspace as another closed site', the same can be said of another important aspect of how the control economy and its media

technologies is inventing *us* and our own knowledge work, philosophy and minds: academic publishing.[36] This can likewise be seen to be undergoing a process of transition: from the walled, disciplinary gardens represented by scholarly associations, learned societies and university presses, to more open, fluid environments. Witness the emphasis currently placed by governments, funding agencies and institutional managers on the more rapid, efficient and competitive means of publishing and circulating academic work associated with the movement for open access. Publishing research and data on such an open basis is heralded as being beneficial by these key players as it facilitates the production of journal and article level-metrics for national research assessment exercises, international league tables and other forms of continuous control through auditing, monitoring and measuring processes (including the REF in the UK, the panels of which now include members drawn from the business community). It also helps to expand existing markets and generate new markets and services. (Tools for metrics and citation indices are frequently owned by corporations, as in the case of Thomson Reuters' Web of Science and Elsevier's Scopus.) The push for open access and open data on the part of governments, funding agencies and institutional managers can thus be said to dovetail all too seamlessly with the neoliberal philosophy that assigns universities the task of carrying out the basic research the private sector has not the time, money or inclination to conduct for itself, while nonetheless granting the latter access to that research and the associated data to enable their commercial application and

exploitation. (This explains why David Willetts, the UK Minister of State for Universities and Science, is so willing to support a version of gold, 'author-pays' open access, even though there exist many more responsible ways of achieving open access, as I have argued elsewhere.)[37]

Further evidence of a shift in academic publishing toward the kind of open and dispersed spaces associated with Deleuze's thesis is provided by the large number of researchers who are currently taking advantage of the opportunities to acquire authority and increase the size of their 'academic footprint' that are offered by the dominant corporate social media and social networks. As with other areas of the control economy, social networks such as Facebook and Google+ are characterized by a 'compulsory individuality' (a term Beverley Skeggs adopts with reference to reality TV).[38] You can't use a pseudonym on Google+, unless you are a celebrity known by such a pseudonym. Thanks to their entry procedures, the only way to join and take part in such corporate networks is through one's own personal (self-)profile. By taking responsibility on themselves for managing, promoting and marketing their work, ideas and *charismatic* individual, authorial personalities in this way using networked digital media technologies, academics can be seen to be caught in modern capital's subjectivation machine just as much as the workers 'Bifo' and Maurizio Lazzarato describe:

> Capitalization is one of the techniques that must contribute to the worker's transformation into ‘human capital'. The latter is then personally responsible for the education and development, growth, accumulation, improvement and valorization of the ‘self' in its capacity as ‘capital'. This is achieved by managing all its relationships, choices, behaviours according to the logic of a costs/investment ratio and in line with the law of supply and demand. Capitalization must help to turn the worker into ‘a kind of permanent, multipurpose business'. The worker is an entrepreneur and entrepreneur of her/himself, ‘being her/his own capital, being her/his own producer, being her/his own source of revenue' (Foucault)…
>
> This idea … is the culmination of capital as a machine of subjectivation.[39]

Publishing today is consequently not an activity academics take part in just *for* and *at* work: with as many as a third of scholars reported to be on Twitter, they publish, and act as entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs of themselves, in all aspects of their life, in all their ‘relationships, choices, behaviours’. [40] The separation between work and non-work is thus becoming difficult for many academics to maintain.

Stiegler's Forgotten Origins

If Deleuze's idea of the control society *is* to be taken seriously as a critique of political economy and of power relations between the social and the technical, then, as Stiegler suggests it is (although, as we shall see, a question mark can be placed against just how seriously he *actually takes this critique himself*), it clearly has significant implications for academic work. The manner in which it is increasingly being formed, organised, categorized, stored, managed, published, disseminated, marketed and promoted now appears very much as a means by which the attention of academics is captured and their thought and behaviour modified, homogenized and sold to entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, shareholders and advertisers. Many of today's university workers are thus left with little time in which they are able to direct their attention free from these forms of control.

Faced by this situation, some scholars and academics have looked back to the values of the traditional university as offering an alternative to the *becoming business* of the contemporary institution.[41] In this context, can the continuing

maintenance of the values associated with writing and publishing *print-on-paper* codex texts be regarded as having a similarly alternate, oppositional, counter or radical aspect - for all they can take on a somewhat reactionary appearance in an era in which digital reproducibility, according to Stiegler, constitutes and overdetermines the relation between human subjectivity, memory and time? To put this question explicitly in the language of Stiegler's philosophy: if 'technical development is a violent disruption of extant programmes that through redoubling give birth to a new programmatics' (he provides as an example the expansion of orthographic writing in classical Greece); and if this is something which is itself 'a process of psychic and collective individuation' ('contemporary disorientation' being the 'experience of an incapacity' to bring about such an 'epochal redoubling', according to Stiegler); can the writing and publishing of papercentric articles, monographs and multi-volume series of books today help to program the epochal redoubling of our current technical system of reproduction so as to produce just such a new programmatics, thus countering the tendency to subjectivation and disindividuation of the economy of control and its cultural and program(ming) industries?[42]

The desire to sustain a discerning critical understanding and analysis of the specificity of digital media technologies certainly goes a long way toward

accounting for Stiegler's own continuing substantial investment in writing and the printed letter as both a medium and material practice, along with the associated forms and techniques of presentation, debate, critical attention and intervention. After all, as far as he is concerned 'critical thought or reflection' is a 'fundamental product of the paradoxical double dimension of memory that appears with linear writing' (i.e. the grammatical rules of the production of texts and their 'fundamental irregularities', the understanding of which renders them a 'test for reason').[43] It is a desire on his part that also helps to explain why he continues to describe many of the tendencies that shape cinema, television, and the technologies of social networking in pessimistic, poisonous, dystopic, moralistic terms:[44] because 'contemporary technical mediation destroys the process of communication that once grounded orthographic writing'. It does so by rendering the criteria of judgement by which the events to be mediated and retained are chosen – and which makes memory precisely a question of politics, for Stiegler – that of a pre-judged and pre-decided 'calculable credit'. (Pre-judged and pre-decided not least because on the networks the 'thinking who… cannot think fast enough and must automate the process of anticipation'.)[45] In fact, the overall tenor of his message regarding digital media tends to be quite one-sided, even though he stresses at various points that he was interested in Web issues before the Web itself existed; and that digital media technologies, as well as being part of the problem of the industrialization of consciousness, also have the potential to give our current control economy different inflections - and

could even provide the 'framework for an industrial model of change' that has moved beyond the consumer age by generating 'new attentional forms that pursue in a different manner the process of psychic and collective individuation'.[46] The impression conveyed nonetheless is that it is primarily the technologies and techniques of writing, the printed letter and the book (facilitating as they do the 'deep attention' Stiegler rather too uncritically follows N. Katherine Hayles and Nicholas Carr in attributing to them, in marked contrast to the supposedly shallow 'hyper attention' often associated with digital technologies), that, at the moment, *really* provide a means of resisting the subordination of individual agency and subjective thought to the formalised, standardised, reproducible and controllable patterns of the cultural and program industries.[47] 'For me writing books is a technic of the self', he declares.[48]

In keeping with his view of the technologies of reproduction as Platonic *pharmaka*, neither simply poisons *nor* cures, Stiegler is quite prepared to acknowledge that 'writing can be deployed as a sophistic or disciplinary individualization', as he puts it in a section on the power of writing in *Taking Care of Youth and the Generations*; and that writing 'as a critical space is obviously and simultaneously duplicitous, pharmacological – and thus "critical" in *that* sense'.[49] Nevertheless, even when Stiegler *does* refer to the affirmative,

productive, generative potential of cinema, multimedia and digital television, he conceives such possibilities in terms that are very much derived from writing, the book, literature and notions of literacy. 'The real problem', he writes when bringing 'The Discrete Image' to a close:

> is to rethink or think otherwise what Hollywood has up to this point done in the domain of the culture industry, to which cinema and television belong…Technology is giving us the chance to modify this relation, in a direction that would bring it closer to the relation of the literate person to literature: it is not possible to synthesize a book without having analyzed literally oneself. It is not possible to read without knowing how to write. And soon it will be possible to see an image analytically: 'television' and 'text' are not simply opposed.[50]

Now a great artist or philosopher for Stiegler is somebody 'really specific, singular - somebody who is recognized as a singularity who has created a new type of circuit on which other people can come and continue the circuits'.[51] It is a description that applies to Stiegler himself in many respects without doubt. Nevertheless, much of what he writes is concerned with the importance and value of paying attention and taking 'care', together with the need to address the

issue of knowledge and its relation to subjectivity afresh in the era of digital reproducibility. As a result, the question arises, just as Stiegler, in his account of how Western philosophy has excluded its origins with technics, sees Heidegger as having forgotten Epimetheus in *Technics and Time, 1*, is there something Stiegler has forgotten (but which, by the very emphasis he places on forgotten origins, on paying attention and on taking care, he can help us remember)? Has he forgotten to pay enough attention to the fact that the publishing of papercentric articles, monographs and multi-volume series of books submitted to learned journals and scholarly presses *does not* take place today outside and apart from the domain of the cultural industries, but is *itself* heavily implicated in the control and homogenization of *our* thought, memory, consciousness and behaviour through its media technologies? In short, is it possible that Stiegler has neglected to pay sufficient critical attention to the cultivation of his *own* self and conditions of his *own* individuation: specifically, the way *his* subjectivity, his way of being and doing a philosopher and academic, is born out of a relation to technics and time? I am thinking in particular of that aspect of our rapidly changing media environment that is associated with the print journal and book publishing industry, and the networks or assemblages of economic, social, legal, technological and infrastructural links and connections that help to shape and formalize the conditions in which knowledge and research can and cannot be created, performed, organized, categorized, published and circulated.

Admittedly, Stiegler draws attention to the 'growing danger' represented by the privatization of the Web and the attentional forms *it* constitutes. He does so because the issue 'is first and foremost political', due to the fact that the Web has become the new space of 'the articulation between psychic individuation and collective individuation, and the site of fights to control the latter.'[52] Yet that part of the publishing industry responsible for producing traditional *print-on-paper* academic journals and books is hardly free from the danger of privatization. Consider the increasing dominance in the English-speaking world of the market-led model of a small number of transnational corporations. Reed Elsevier, Springer, Wiley-Blackwell, and Taylor & Francis/Informa are far more concerned with productivity, efficiency, instrumentality and the pursuit of maximum profit than with increasing circulation and making knowledge and research available to those who need it. Indeed, according to one newspaper headline they make Rupert Murdoch look like a socialist.[53] Evidence their already extremely high and still increasing journal subscription charges, for those in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) especially;[54] the 'Big Deal', multi-year, contract bundling strategies, which insist institutional libraries buy large numbers of publisher-generated packages of journals, and which prevent institutions cancelling subscriptions to even a single title; and the protection of copyright and licensing restrictions, not least through their support for measures such as SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act) and PIPA (Protect IP Act) in the US. Such policies led to an 'Academic Spring' in

2012, whereby over 12,000 academics signed a public petition protesting against the business practices of the largest of these mega-publishers, Elsevier (reported to make €724 million annual profits on its journals alone). In contributing to the petition, academics pledged not to support Elsevier journals, either by publishing in them or by undertaking editorial and peer-review work for them, unless Elsevier withdrew its support for the Research Works Act, aimed at curbing government mandated open access policies in the US.[55] More recently, there has been a call to boycott both Taylor & Francis and Routledge if their parent company, Informa plc, does not bring down its journal subscriptions charges and pay the UK Exchequer the approximately £13 million lost to the treasury as a result of its 2009 decision to become a Jersey company domiciled in Zug, the canton with the lowest rate of taxation in Switzerland.[56] (Informa can thus be placed alongside Amazon, Apple, Facebook, eBay and Google on the list of companies that aggressively avoid paying the standard rate of 26% corporation tax in the UK.) With over 'half of Informa's total annual operating profit… derived from academic publishing: £85.8 million' in 2010, and its journals alone providing 'gross profit margins of over 70 per cent', such a boycott would have consequences for some of the most highly respected titles in the critical theory and radical philosophy fields.[57]

The related ‘dismantling’ of the kind of enclosed, disciplinary publishing organisation designed more to serve charitable aims and the public good – scholarly associations, learned societies, university presses, non-profit and not-for-profit publishers – provides still further evidence of the dangers of privatisation facing that part of the publishing industry responsible for producing traditional *print-on-paper* academic journals and books.[58] The already high and still increasing costs of journal subscriptions, combined with cuts to library budgets, subsidies and other sources of funding, has ‘strangled libraries and led to fewer and fewer purchases of books/monographs’.[59] This has produced a ‘monograph crisis’, which is shorthand for the way the already uncertain sustainability of the print monograph is being placed at further risk by the ever-decreasing sales of academic books.[60] The fall in demand for academic monographs has in turn resulted in presses producing smaller and shorter print runs. As a result, those volumes that *are* published are not distributed as widely as they may have been in the past, with many going out of print after eighteen months.[61] Presses have also tended to favour publishing monographs from established academics who already have a strong readership, if not intellectual stars, rather than developing the next generation of scholars, whose sales are initially likely to be low, yet who need to publish a research-led volume nonetheless if they are to get a foot on the career ladder and acquire that all important first full-time position. Traditional print scholarly publishing cannot therefore be said to be explicitly dedicated to promoting the longevity, heritage

and intra-generational transmission from old to young – a process that for Stiegler forms an integral part of the production and selection of pre-individual funds.

So hostile has the situation for publishing organizations designed to serve the long-term public good become that many of them are being forced to open up their walled gardens to the market and operate as if they were profit-maximising businesses themselves. In fact a good number of them are being handed over to the corporations, either in part or in whole.[62] They are thus finding themselves in the position of having to make decisions about what to publish (and consequently of having a major say in who gets to have a career as an academic, researcher, theorist or philosopher and who does not) *more* on the basis of the market and a given text's potential value as a commodity, and *less* on the basis of its quality and value as a piece of peer-reviewed, properly referenced disciplinary scholarship and research. Some publishers are even moving much of their focus away from advanced level, full-length research monographs – especially those perceived as being radical, experimental, inter-disciplinary or avant-garde, or which deal with areas of thought regarded as particularly difficult, specialized or obscure – to concentrate on text books, readers, introductions, reference works and more fashionable, commercial, marketable titles. There has been a recent boom in the UK and US, for example, in short

academic/trade books focusing on particular films and TV programmes, such as *Lost in Translation* and *Dr Who*, scholarly publishers thus tying themselves ever closer to the cultural industries and the system they form 'with industry as such, of which the function consists in manufacturing consumption patterns by massifying life styles'.[63]

When it comes to the threat of privatization and fights to control the space of articulation between psychic individuation and collective individuation, then, 'print' and the 'Web' cannot be simply contrasted in terms of an offline-online dialectic. Concepts, values and habitual practices inherited from the era of writing, the book, and especially the industrialisation of printing which took place from the middle of the 18th century onwards – the indivisible and individualized proprietorial author, mass printing, uniform multiple-copy editions, 'fixity', the long-form argument, originality, author's rights, copyright and so on – are far from providing an unproblematic means of countering the *becoming business* of the contemporary university. In fact, these historically inherited concepts, values and practices also constitute some of the *main* ways in which knowledge, research and thought are being commodified and corporatized by publishers of academic work; publishers whose business models nowadays very much depend on turning even the publicly funded labour of radical philosophers such as Stiegler into marketable commodities.

Nevertheless, as Dymitri Kleiner makes clear, authors and artists ‘continue to be flattered by their association with the myth of the creative genius, turning a blind eye to how it is used to justify their exploitation and expand the privilege of the property-owning elite.’ It is a state of denial and delegation of decision-making (it could even be called cowardly in Stiegler’s language) that has profound consequences for how we live, work, act and think as theorists and philosophers:

> Copyright pits author against author in a war of competition for originality. Its effects are not just economic; copyright also naturalizes a certain process of knowledge production, de-legitimizes the notion of a common culture, and cripples social relations. Artists are not encouraged to share their thoughts, expressions and works, or to contribute to a common pool of creativity. Instead, they are compelled to jealously guard their ‘property' from others who they view as potential competitors, spies and thieves lying in wait to snatch and defile their original ideas.[64]

From this point of view (not to mention that of Anonymous, Occupy, and the *Indignadas* with which we began), many of the *tendencies* of which the current political economy of philosophy and theory is composed appear as yet another branch of the contemporary cultural industries: not just as some theorists and

philosophers managing to ‘individuate themselves more intensely than others, and in doing so contribute more than others to the collective individuation’;[65] but as some theorists and philosophers *also* acting as entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs of themselves, as Lazzarato puts it, to market and promote their texts, and make sure that the *original* ideas they contain (e.g. concerning object-oriented philosophy, new materialism, and so forth) are attributed to them as their (intellectual) *property*, thus both enclosing and branding these texts and ideas by association with a proper name.[66] If we do follow Stiegler in taking the idea of the control society seriously, we can see that they are likewise engaged in ‘a war of competition for originality’, implicitly and explicitly fighting with other critical thinkers over the ‘modulating principle of individual performance and merit’ which ‘runs through each’ (as measured by the amount and quality of publications, keynotes, and other indicators of reputation, impact, influence and esteem), in order to gain advantage in the struggle for publishing opportunities, book contracts, jobs, promotion, grants, sabbaticals, support, resources, attention, recognition, fame.[67]

All of which raises a number of questions regarding how Stiegler *acts out* what it is to be a radical philosopher – for all he is frequently operating across the different publishing and academic systems of the English and French-speaking worlds. For in this respect academic monographs also appear as machines for

‘the production of ready-made ideas, for “clichés”’, whose ‘criteria of selection are aspects of marketability’. Monographs, too, are a means of standardizing and controlling thought, memory and behavior (e.g. regarding authorship, originality, author’s rights, copyright, intellectual property), ‘through the formatting and artificial manufacturing of desires’ of the individual theorist or philosopher, including those for pre-eminence, authority and disciplinary power.[68] Such desires (or drives, since ‘a desire presupposes a singularity’, for Stiegler) do much to explain the situation whereby the majority of even politically radical academic authors are willing to turn a blind eye and concede to the insistence of publishers that the rights to turn their text into a commodity that can be bought and sold for profit be transferred to them: because in exchange the author will have their work edited, copy-edited, proofed, typeset, formatted, designed, published, distributed, marketed, promoted and sold, and thus hopefully read, recognized and engaged with by others. In continuing to invest his time, care and attention so heavily in the writing and publishing of conventional print codex books can Stiegler be said to be exhibiting some of the very herd-like behavior, the ‘*generalised herdification*’, he condemns the cultural and program industries for producing in consumers in his essay on ‘How the Cultural Industry Destroys the Individual’? Is this not a variation on the ‘*liquidation of the exception*’? By being deprived of their individuality in this fashion, are even radical theorists and philosophers such as Stiegler – like the consumers of hyper-industrial capitalism – ‘lacking becoming, that is,

lacking a future'?[69] In short, is there insufficient scope here too for the event, for singularity, for the 'welcoming of the new and opening of the undetermined to the improbable'?

Wanted: Radically New Ways of Being Theorists and Philosophers

If Stiegler is right, then, and if, with the Web and digital reproducibility, we have indeed embarked on a 'radically new stage of the life of the mind whereby the whole question of knowledge is raised anew', this clearly has implications for our understanding of digital media technologies.[70] Just as importantly, it also has significant implications for our own ways of creating, performing and circulating knowledge and ideas as theorists and philosophers. Not least, it suggests we need to be open to forms and techniques of analysis and critique that do not privilege writing and the associated acting out of the self as somehow separate from those technologies that provide it with a means of expression. Rather, it requires us to be open to what I would understand as more ethical and political forms of analysis and critique that welcome the new by helping to generate subjectivities that are very different to how we currently live, work, act and think. This includes ways of being theorists and philosophers that depart from the self-disciplining neoliberal model of the entrepreneurial

academic associated with corporate social media and social networks. However, it also includes ways of being that are different from the traditional, Romantic, humanist, liberal model, with its enactment of clichéd, ready-made ideas of authorship, originality, the book, intellectual property and copyright. For in their own ways *both* of these models are involved in the subordination of our agency and consciousness to the calculable, controllable, pre-programmed patterns and routines of the contemporary cultural industries. The question is, of course, what forms might such different ways of creating, performing and circulating theory and philosophy take? Would they even be recognizable as theory and philosophy?

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[1] Franco 'Bifo' Berardi, 'Cognitarian Subjectivation', in J. Aranda, B. Kuan-Wood and A. Vidokle (eds), *Are You Working Too Much? Post-Fordism, Precarity, and the Labor of Art*, Berlin, Sternberg Press, 2011; Jodi Dean, *Blog Theory: Feedback and Capture in the Circuits of Drive*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010.

[2] Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*, Cambridge, Polity, 2012; Felix Stalder, 'Enter the Swarm: Anonymous and the Global Protest Movements', *Neural*, 42, Summer 2012, pp6-9.

[3] Mark Poster goes even further: of the 'major theorists from the 1970s onwards' whose thought has significantly influenced the study of the 'impact of media on culture', he identifies Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, Jurgen Habermas, and Judith Butler as being among those who themselves 'either paid no attention at all to the vast changes in media culture taking place under their noses or who commented on the media only as a tool that amplified other institutions like capitalism or representative democracy'. Poster positions the Deleuze of 'Postscript on Control Societies', along with Vilém Flusser, Marshall McLuhan, Jean Baudrillard, Walter Benjamin, Harold Innis and Hans Magnus Enzensberger as notable exceptions to this general rule. (Mark Poster, 'An Introduction to Vilém Flusser's *Into the Universe of Technical Images* and *Does Writing Have a Future?*', in V. Flusser, *Does Writing Have a Future?*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2011, pxi).

Granted, the digital humanities might be said to constitute one example of scholars beginning to take into account some of the implications changes in the media landscape have for their own ways of creating, performing and circulating knowledge and research. Yet how many of those who identify with the digital humanities can at this point be thought of as being an influential 'major theorist' to rank alongside Foucault, Lacan et al; or would wish to be, given the emphasis in the field on moving away from theory and toward methodology and more positivistic, quantitative and empirical modes of analysis? For one exploration of the digital humanities' relationship with theory, see Gary Hall, 'Towards a Post-Digital Humanities: Cultural Analytics and the Computational Turn to Data-Driven Scholarship', *American Literature* (forthcoming).

[4] Stanley Fish, 'The Digital Humanities and the Transcending of Mortality', *New York Times: Opinionator*, 9 January 2012, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/the-digital-humanities-and-the-transcending-of-mortality/.

[5] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, p57.

[6] Bernard Stiegler, 'Derrida and Technology: Fidelity at the Limits of Deconstruction and the Prosthesis of Faith', in T. Cohen (ed.), *Jacques Derrida and the Humanities*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p239.

[7] Bernard Stiegler, 'The Discrete Image', in J. Derrida and B. Stiegler, *Echographies of Television*, Cambridge, Polity, 2002, p155.

[8] See Mark Hansen, 'Media Theory', *Theory, Culture & Society*, Volume 23, Numbers 2-3, 2006; N. Katherine Hayles, *How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2012, p30-31. Hansen writes that: 'What the massive acceleration of the evolution of technics makes overwhelmingly clear is that human evolution is necessarily, and has always been, co-evolution *with* technics. Human evolution is "technogenesis" in the sense that humans have always evolved in recursive correlation with the evolution of technics' (p300).

[9] Geoffrey Bennington, 'Emergencies', *The Oxford Literary Review*, Volume 18, 1996, p185.

[10] Mark Hansen, '"Realtime Synthesis" and the Différance of the Body: Technocultural Studies in the Wake of Deconstruction', *Culture Machine*, Volume 6, 2004, http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/9/8.

[11] This idea of value conflicts with that 'measured through the concept of information and consequently conceived of as calculable', as the 'determination of the undetermined' (Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation*, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 2009, p98).

[12] Ibid., p112.

[13] Bernard Stiegler, 'Suffocated Desire, or How the Cultural Industry Destroys the Individual: Contribution to a Theory of Mass Consumption', *parrehsia*, Number 13, 2011, http://parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia13/parrhesia13_steigler.pdf.

[14] Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 2*, op cit., p6. Technics and the human are here joined together in what Simondon refers to as the 'transductive' relationship, 'a relationship whose elements are constituted such that one cannot exist without the other' (p 2).

[15] Bernard Stiegler, *For a New Critique of Political Economy*, Cambridge, Polity, 2010, p11, 43.

[16] Ian Bogost, 'Ian Became a Fan of Marshall McLuhan on Facebook and Suggested You Become a Fan Too', in D. E. Wittkower (ed.), *Facebook and Philosophy*, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 2010, p31-2.

[17] Derrida, *Echographies*, op cit., p58.

[18] 4chan is a precursor to Anonymous. For a brief history of both, see Stalder, 'Enter the Swarm', op cit. Interestingly, one of the first organised actions on 4Chan was against the social networking site Habbo Hotel.

[19] 'About', Unlike Us: Understanding Social Media Monopolies and their Alternatives, http://networkcultures.org/wpmu/unlikeus/about/, accessed 27 May 2013.

[20] As Hansen makes clear, this is much more of a problem for Stiegler than Derrida:

> Because he thinks that *différance* simply is more originary than technics, Derrida can take for granted the possibility for a critical relationship to teletechnologies, albeit one that (in today's real time scenario) is necessarily deferred to the future. For Stiegler, on the other hand, there can be no such transcendental solution, since the possibility for transcendence is itself transductively correlated with technics. (op cit.)

[21] I am here partly paraphrasing Fish's argument in 'The Digital Humanities', op cit.

[22] Bernard Stiegler, *Acting Out*, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 2009, p39, 52, 54, 72.

[23] There is not the space here to analyse the many differences and similarities between the publishing industries - and their relations to the academic systems and cultural industries - of France and the English speaking world. For one historical account, see Stefan Collini, 'Intellectuals in Britain and France in the Twentieth Century: Confusions, Contracts – and Convergences', in J. Jennings (ed.), *Intellectuals in Twentieth-Century France: Mandarins and Samurais*, London, Macmillan, 1993.

[24] http://www.arsindustrialis.org/

[25] Bernard Stiegler, 'Bernard Stiegler, director of IRI (Innovation and Research Institute) at the Georges Pompidou Center, and www2012 keynote speaker', *21st International World Wide Web Conference*, Lyon, France, 16-20 April 2012, http://www2012.wwwconference.org/hidden/interview-of-bernard-stiegler/.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Pharmakon.fr, Ecole de philosophie d'Epineuil-le-Fleuriel, includes a philosophy course accessible on the internet to those who are members of the Ars Industrialis network, and a 'summer academy' designed to serve as an occasion to 'reflect on what a "technics of self" is in the digital age'. See Bernard Stiegler, 'A Rational Theory of Miracles: On Pharmacology and Transindividuation', New Formations, 77, 2013, p173-174.

[28] Stiegler, *For a New Critique*, op cit., p11.

[29] Alexander R. Galloway, 'Bernard Stiegler, or Our Thoughts are With Control', *French Theory Today: An Introduction to Possible Futures*, New York, Erudio Editions, 2010, p3, http://cultureandcommunication.org/galloway/FTT/French-Theory-Today.pdf.

[30] Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1998, p177.

[31] Galloway, 'Bernard Stiegler', op cit., p11-12.

[32] Stefan Collini, 'Browne's Gamble', *London Review of Books*, Vol. 32, No. 21, 4 November 2010, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n21/stefan-collini/brownes-gamble.

[33] Lord Browne et al, *Securing a Sustainable Future for Higher Education: An Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance*, October 2010, p23, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31999/10-1208-securing-sustainable-higher-education-browne-report.pdf.

[34] Stevphen Shukaitis and Anja Kanngieser, 'Cultural Workers Throw Down YR Tools, the Metropolis is on Strike', *The Metropolitan Factory: Making a Living as a Creative Worker*, 2012, p55, http://metropolitanfactory.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/cultural-workers-throw-down-yr-tools-the-metropolis-is-on-strike.pdf.

[35] Stiegler, *For a New Critique*, op cit., p38, 131, n12.

[36] Gilles Deleuze, 'Control and Becoming', *Negotiations: 1972-1990*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995, p175.

[37] David Willetts, 'Public Access to Publicly-Funded Research', *BIS: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills*, 2 May 2012, http://www.bis.gov.uk/news/speeches/david-willetts-public-access-to-research; Gary Hall, *Digitize This Book!: The Politics of New Media, or Why We Need Open Access Now*, Minneapolis and London, University of Minnesota Press, 2008.

[38] Beverley Skeggs, 'The Making of Class and Gender Through Visualizing Moral Subject Formations', *Sociology*, Vol.39(5), 2005, p965-82.

[39] Maurizio Lazzarato, 'The Misfortunes of the "Artistic Critique" and of Cultural Employment', in G. Raunig (ed.), *Critique of Creativity: Precarity, Subjectivity and Resistance in the 'Creative Industries'*, London, MayFlyBooks, 2011, p47, http://mayflybooks.org/?page_id=74.

[40] Jason Priem, Dario Taraborelli, Paul Groth, Cameron Neylon, 'altmetrics: a manifesto', *altmetrics*, 26 October 2010, http://altmetrics.org/manifesto/.

[41] For one example, see the values and aims of the newly established Council for the Defence of British Universities, http://cdbu.org.uk/?page_id=10.

[42] Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 2*, op cit., p60, 7. Stiegler provides the following explanation of 'epochal redoubling':

> A text belongs to knowledge to the degree … that there can be no end-point to its (re-)reading. The after-effect of this textual 'belonging' to knowledge consists of its being always already between constituted programmatic, *epokhal* stablilities, and as what always returns to haunt them (to topple them in order to reconstitute them). If *tekhnē* suspends the programs in force, then knowledge also returns to suspend all stable effects, *tekhnē's* 'repercussions', by redoubling them. This is *epokhal redoubling*. (p.60)

[43] Op cit., p59.

[44] See *For a New Critique*, op cit., p44. Here, as is frequently the case in Stiegler's work – and in marked contrast to the care and attention with which he reads Heidegger, Husserl, Simondon and others - there is little or no specificity to the analysis of social networking provided, let alone singularity. Instead, Stiegler tends to deal with social networking in the abstract, as a somewhat vague general category, class, genre or type of media technology, rather than devoting care and attention to the critical scrutiny of a particular communication platform or, better, *environment*, such as Facebook or LinkedIn.

[45] Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 2*, op cit., p 9, 141.

[46] Stiegler, *World Wide Web Conference*, op cit.; 'Relational Ecology and the Digital Pharmakon', *Culture Machine*, Volume 13, 2012, p8, http://culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/464/501.

[47] Stiegler, 'Relational Ecology', ibid., p5; N. Katherine Hayles, 'Hyper and Deep Attention: The Generational Divide in Cognitive Modes', *Profession*, 13, 2007; Nicholas Carr, *The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains*, New York, W. W. Norton & Co, 2010.

[48] Bernard Stiegler and Irit Rogoff, 'Transindividuation', *e-flux journal* #14, March 2010, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/transindividuation/.

[49] Stiegler, *Taking Care*, op cit., p130. Elsewhere, Stiegler shows how the 'power of writing' can also lead to 'a process of *subjectivation*, which is actually a *sujéction*, or submission, leading in turn to de-subjectification and *disindividuation*' (Bernard Stiegler, 'The Most Precious Good in the Era of Social Technologies', in G. Lovink and M. Rasch (eds), *Unlike Us: Social Media and their Alternatives,* Amsterdam, Institute of Network Cultures, 2012, p25).

[50] Stiegler, 'Discrete Image', op cit., p163.

Stiegler's privileging of writing and the associated forms and techniques of presentation, debate and critical attention as a means of analysing digital media technologies is also apparent in his notion that the digital is 'the contemporary form of writing' (Stiegler, 'Relational Ecology', op cit., p15); and in his very concept of grammatization and 'the grammatization process, which allows the discretization of behaviours, gestures, talks, flows and moves of any kind and which consists in a spatialization of time' (Stiegler, World Wide Web Conference, op cit.). Stiegler's understanding of this process, too – for all its association with behaviours, gestures and moves of any kind - is derived from writing and literacy. Thus in *Echographies*, Stiegler says that, 'Just as, in print culture, the school was created to develop this kind of knowledge, we can imagine that a kind of knowledge of the image might be constituted'. Yet for him, 'it is pretty obvious we can't conceive of grammarians, or therefore of teachers or of students, unless the technics of writing, which gives language this lettered relation, and the instrumental kinds of knowledge it makes possible, are to a large extent appropriated' (op cit., pp58-60).

[51] Stiegler, 'Transindividuation', op cit.

[52] Stiegler, *World Wide Web Conference*, op cit.

[53] George Monbiot, 'Academic Publishers make Murdoch look like a Socialist', *The Guardian*, 29 August 2011.

[54] There is not the space here to go into the political economy of academic publishing in any detail. To quickly provide some recently collected figures:

> journal prices in the United States increased by 10.8 per cent in 1995, 9.9 per cent in 1996, 10.3 per cent in 1997, and 10.4 per cent in 1998. According to other survey data, the average serial unit cost more than tripled between 1986 and 2003, increasing from US$89.77 to US$283.08. This increase far outpaced the 68 per cent rate of inflation during this same period.
>
> Even in the most recent years following the global economic meltdown of 2008, serials prices rose at rates between four and five per cent, well above the negative rate of inflation in 2009 and the 1.6 per cent level of inflation in 2010. According to EBSCO, between 2007 and 2011 journal prices increased by almost 30 per cent for U.S.-based titles and almost 34 per cent for non-U.S. titles.
>
> (Wilhelm Peekhaus, 'The Enclosure and Alienation of Academic Publishing: Lessons for the Professoriate', *tripleC*, 10(2), 2012, p582, http://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/issue/current).

[55] http://thecostofknowledge.com/

[56] David Harvie, Geoff Lightfoot, Simon Lilley and Kenneth Weir, 'What Are We To Do With Feral Publishers?', submitted for publication in *Organization*, accessed through the Leicester Research Archive, http://hdl.handle.net/2381/9689.

[57] Harvie *et al*, 'What Are We To Do', op cit.

Nor do independent publishers escape their attention. Harvie *et al* also call on editors, writers and readers to abandon *Organization*, the journal to which they have submitted their paper, and start up an identical yet more affordable alternative, if its publisher, Sage - which has an operating profit margin of a little below 19 per cent and 'gross profit across both books and journals of over 60 per cent' - does not lower its prices to those of a comparable society title, 'such as the £123 charged for the AMJ or the £182 for ASQ'. Interestingly, the entire editorial board of the *Journal of Library Administration* has resigned in protest at the author agreement of Taylor & Francis, which included a $2995 fee to be paid by the author. See Brian Matthews, 'So I'm Editing This Journal And…', *The Ubiquitous Librarian*, 23 March 2013, http://chronicle.com/blognetwork/theubiquitouslibrarian/2013/03/23/so-im-editing-this-journal-issue-and/.

[58] Deleuze, 'Control and Becoming', op cit., p175.

As Peekhaus notes, the bundles put together by the mega-publishers 'represent significant portions of a library's annual acquisitions budget, so when cuts in the collection have to be made it is often the stand-alone journals from smaller publishers that are cancelled. Aside from reducing access for the community served by the academic library, bundling practices also intensify the tendencies towards concentration and monopoly power of the commercial publishing oligarchs' (op cit., p582).

[59] Jean Kempf, 'Social Sciences and Humanities Publishing and the Digital "Revolution"', unpublished manuscript, 2010, http://perso.univ-lyon2.fr/~jkempf/Digital_SHS_Publishing.pdf; John Thompson, *Books in the Digital Age: the Transformation of Academic and Higher Education Publishing in Britain and the United States*, Cambridge UK, Malden MA, Polity Press, 2005.

[60] 'Greco and Wharton state that the average library monographs purchases have dropped from 1500 in the 1970s to 200-300 currently. Thompson estimates that print runs and sales have declined from 2000-3000 (print runs and sales) in the 1970s to print runs of between 600-1000 and sales of in between 400-500 nowadays' (Janneke Adema and Eelco Ferwerda, 'Open Access for Monographs: The Quest for a Sustainable Model to Save the Endangered Scholarly Book', *LOGOS*, 20/1-4, 2009, p182, n10. See also Janneke Adama and Gary Hall, 'The Political Nature of the Book: On Artists' Books and Radical Open Access', *New Formations* (forthcoming).

[61] 'In the 1970s average print runs of 2000 books were quite common, whereas at the start of the new century, figures of around 400 copies have become more commonplace' (Adema and Ferwerda, 'Open Access for Monographs', ibid., p177).

[62] In 2008 Striphas was already able to show that 'for-profit publishers have a stake in 62% of all peer-reviewed scholarly journals.' Given that even a 'conservative estimate places the total number of peer-reviewed journals now in existence at around 20,000' – although some have placed it considerably higher - 'this means commercial entities as a whole control some 12,400 of them, two-thirds of which they own exclusively', the remaining third being produced 'under contract with various learned societies' (Ted Striphas, 'Acknowledged Goods' Worksite, *Differences and Repetitions: The Wiki Site for Rhizomatic Writing*, 2008, http://striphas.wikidot.com/acknowledged-goods-worksite).

[63] Stiegler, 'Suffocated Desire', op cit.

[64] Dmytri Kleiner, *The Telecommumist Manifesto*, Amsterdam, Institute of Network Cultures, 2010, p31, http://telekommunisten.net/the-telekommunist-manifesto/.

[65] Stiegler, 'Relational Ecology', op cit., p13.

[66] It is interesting to read the account of the importance of the 'egalitarian nature of blogs' to the development of object-oriented ontology provided by Bryant et al (Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Garham Harman (eds), *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism*, Melbourne, re.press, 2011, p6), in the light of Robertson's point that 'the blog reveals itself to be the logical conclusion of a process by which each scholar, because of the uniqueness of her scholarship, must establish her own journal in which to publish' (Benjamin J. Robertson, 'The Grammatization of Scholarship', *Amodern*, 16 January 2013, http://amodern.net/article/the-grammatization-of-scholarship/). For a brief analysis of how notions of the author, originality and copyright are enacted in object-oriented philosophy, see Gary Hall, 'How We Remain Modern', *MediaCommons*, 14 March 2013, http://mediacommons.futureofthebook.org/question/what-are-major-sociallegalprofessional-stakes-sharing-online/response/how-we-remain-modern. For a critical engagement with the field positioning and publishing rhetoric of new materialism, see Dennis Bruining, 'A Somatechnics of Moralism: New Materialism or Material Foundationalism', *Somatechnics*, 3.1, 2013.

[67] Deleuze, 'Postscript', op cit., p179.

[68] Stiegler, 'Suffocated Desire' op cit.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Stiegler, *World Wide Web Conference*, op cit.